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The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
part, the following: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same of-
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... I" Thus, successive
prosecutions are barred by the fifth amendment only if the two offenses
for which the defendant is prosecuted are the "same" for double jeopardy
purposes. It is, for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, well settled
that when a defendant in a single act violates the "peace and dignity" of
two sovereignties by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two
distinct "offenses." ' 2 This principle, known as the dual sovereignty doc-
trine, 3 permits successive prosecutions by two sovereignties for the same
"act."
The unique factual setting of Heath v. Alabama 4 gave the United
States Supreme Court the opportunity to apply the dual sovereignty doc-
trine to successive prosecutions by two different states. Prior to Heath,
all but one of the cases upholding the dual sovereignty doctrine have
involved successive prosecutions by the federal government and a partic-
ular state.5 In Heath, the Supreme Court held that because two states
constitute separate sovereignties, successive prosecutions by two states
for the same conduct are not barred by the double jeopardy clause. 6
This comment will focus on the Supreme Court's decision in Heath
v. Alabama, with an emphasis on the Court's decision to give great
weight to maintaining the balance in our federal system as the basis for
extending the dual sovereignty doctrine to permit successive prosecutions
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In 1969, the double jeopardy clause was made applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969).
2. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
3. See id. at 382 ("We have here two sovereignties ... .
4. 106 S. Ct. 433 (1985).
5. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (Court upheld successive prosecutions by
Navajo tribal authorities and the federal government).
6. Under the doctrine of dual sovereignty, the double jeopardy clause does not prevent sepa-
rate sovereignties from bringing successive prosecutions for the same "offense." When an act vio-
lates the laws of two sovereignties, it is, in effect, two distinct offenses. See Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382
(state and federal governments are separate sovereignties).
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by two states. 7  This comment will also examine the past and present
status of the dual sovereignty theory in reaching the conclusion that the
Heath decision is a well-reasoned opinion resulting in the logical exten-
sion of the dual sovereignty doctrine. Finally, this comment will discuss
the impact that the Heath decision will have on the availability of succes-
sive prosecutions.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The dual sovereignty doctrine has its basis in the common law no-
tion that a crime is an offense against the sovereignty of the government.
The Supreme Court first expressed the basic premises of the doctrine in
three cases decided in the years 1847-1852.8 The first, Fox v. Ohio,9 did
not directly present the issue of successive trials.10 However, the Fox
Court explained that, in the federal-state context, a citizen can be pun-
ished by either the federal government or his state because he owes a
separate and independent allegiance to each sovereign." Similarly, in
United States v. Marigold 12 and Moore v. Illinois,13 the Court reaffirmed
the power of the state and federal governments to prosecute an individual
for a single act which violates a statute of each without one prosecution
barring the other. The dictum of Fox v. Ohio 14 was reiterated in a series
of cases prior to 1922,15 all of which dealt with only the possibility of
multiple prosecutions.
In 1922, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in United
States v. Lanza.16 Lanza was the first case in which the Court directly
addressed the issue of successive prosecutions of a defendant for separate
"offenses" arising out of a single "act." In Lanza, the defendants were
charged in federal court with manufacturing, transporting, and possess-
ing intoxicating liquor in violation of the Volstead Act. The defendants
claimed that a prior prosecution under a Washington state statute for
manufacturing, transporting, and possessing intoxicating liquor was a
7. 106 S. Ct. 437-40 (1985).
8. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
560 (1850); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
9. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
10. The central question posed in Fox was whether the states had the power to punish the
passing of counterfeit money under their own laws and in their own courts. Id at 412-13.
11. Id. at 435.
12. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
13. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
14. 46 U.S. at 435.
15. See, e.g., McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 358-59 (1922); Southern Ry. v. Railroad
Comm'n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439 (1915); Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640 (1898); Cross v. North
Carolina, 132 U.S. 131, 139 (1889); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 389-91 (1879).
16. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
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bar to a subsequent federal prosecution for the same act. 17 Chief Justice
Taft, citing the long line of cases dating back to Fox v. Ohio, held that the
subsequent federal prosecution (after the state conviction) did not violate
the double jeopardy clause.' 8 The Lanza Court's conclusion that the
federal prosecution was valid rested on the fact that "an act denounced
as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against
the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each."' 9
Four years later in Hebert v. Louisiana,20 the Court cited Lanza
with approval as the basis for sustaining a conviction under a Louisiana
prohibition statute that followed a federal prosecution.2t By this time,
the constitutionality of successive prosecutions by a state and the federal
government was well settled. It was not until 1959, in its decisions in
Abbate v. United States22 and Bartkus v. Illinois,23 that the Supreme
Court reexamined the dual sovereignty doctrine.
In Abbate, the defendants, already convicted in a state court, were
subsequently prosecuted for the same conduct in a federal court. 24 Bart-
kus involved a federal acquittal followed by a state conviction. 25 In both
instances, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, thus reinforcing
the Lanza rule of successive prosecutions. The holdings in Bartkus and
17. The defendant argued that the subsequent federal prosecution violated the double jeopardy
clause since both the state and federal statutes derived their authority from the same source- § 2 of
the eighteenth amendment. Id. at 379-80.
18. Id. at 382.
19. Chief Justice Taft wrote:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing
with the same subject matter within the same territory. Each may, without interference by
the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give
validity to acts prohibited by the Amendment. Each government, in determining what
shall be an offense against its peace and dignity, is exercising its own sovereignty, not that
of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is
an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each.
Id.
20. 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
21. Hebert is factually similar to Lanza. In Hebert, like Lanza, the Court held that the power
of a state to declare criminal the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor, and to prosecute of-
fenders, is not derived from the eighteenth amendment. Id. at 314-15.
22. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
23. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
24. In Abbate, the defendants were convicted in a Mississippi federal court for conspiring (18
U.S.C. § 371) to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1362 which provides a penalty for the destruction of a means of
communication operated or controlled by the United States. Prior to this, the defendants had been
prosecuted and convicted in an Illinois state court for violating an Illinois statute making it a crime
to conspire to injure or destroy the property of another. Each defendant was sentenced to three
months imprisonment for violating the Illinois Criminal Code. 359 U.S. at 188.
25. Bartkus was tried and convicted in a federal district court for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113,
which makes it a crime to rob a federally insured bank. He was later convicted in an Illinois state
court for violation of an Illinois robbery statute (ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, § 501 (1951)). 359 U.S. at
122.
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Abbate were a result of the significant weight given to the concept of
federalism 26 and its role in our constitutional system. As separate polit-
ical entities, 27 the states and federal government have the power, inherent
in any sovereignty, to determine what shall be an offense against its au-
thority, and to punish such offenses. 28
The final step in the development of the dual sovereignty doctrine
was its application outside the federal-state context.29 In United States v.
Wheeler,30 the Court held that the Navajo Tribe, whose power to prose-
cute its members for tribal offenses is derived from the Tribe's "primeval
sovereignty"31 rather than from federal authority, is a distinct sover-
eignty from the federal government for purposes of the dual sovereignty
doctrine.3 2 Thus, the Court continued to make the crucial determination
by looking at the ultimate source of power under which a prosecution
was carried out and by seeing whether the two entities draw their author-
ity to punish from distinct sources of power. 33
The Court, in Heath v. Alabama, was the first to apply the dual
sovereignty doctrine in the state-state context. The historical develop-
ment 34 of the dual sovereignty doctrine, and its importance to the Ameri-
can federal system, are crucial to understanding the Court's rationale, as
26. In Abbate, the Court gave significant weight to federalism because it found that to overrule
Lanza "would bring about a marked change in the distribution of powers to administer criminal
justice, for the States under our federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and
prosecuting crimes." 359 U.S. at 195. In Bartkus, the Court noted that "It would be in derogation
of our federal system to displace the reserved power of States over state offenses by reason of prose-
cution of minor federal offenses by federal authorities beyond the control of the States." 359 U.S. at
137.
27. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819) ("In America, the powers
of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the States. They are
each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the
objects committed to the other.").
28. For excellent articles on the subject of successive prosecutions by state and federal govern-
ments, see Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties, and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591 (1961); Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments. Another Exercise in
Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538 (1967); Comment, Successive Prosecutions by State and Federal
Governments for Offenses Arising Out of the Same Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 534 (1960).
29. See, e.g., Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (state and municipality not separate sover-
eignties); Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937) (federal and territorial courts not sepa-
rate sovereignties); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907) (U.S. Military Court and territorial
court not separate sovereignties).
30. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
31. Id. at 328 (tribal authority is in no way attributable to any delegation of federal authority).
32. Id. at 332.
33. Compare Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 393 (1970) (municipality is a creation of the state,
and therefore, its power emanates from the same source) with United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 328 (1978) (Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory, and thus, their power derives from sources different from that of
the federal government).
34. For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the dual sovereignty doctrine, see
L. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1968).
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well as the significant impact that this case has on individual rights. 35
FACTS OF THE CASE
In August of 1981, Larry Gene Heath hired two men to kill his wife,
Rebecca Heath. On August 31, 1981, the two men, Charles Owens and
Gregory Lumpkin, kidnapped Mrs. Heath from her home in Russell
County, Alabama.36 Rebecca Heath's body was later found in the trunk
of the Heath car on the side of a road in Troup County, Georgia. The
cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head. The evidence indicated
that the murder took place in Georgia, a fact not disputed by the State of
Alabama.
3 7
Larry Heath was arrested by Georgia authorities five days later.
Dual investigations by the Alabama and Georgia authorities, in which
they cooperated to some extent, led to Heath's arrest and subsequent
confession. 38 In his confession, Heath admitted that he had arranged his
wife's kidnapping and murder. In November 1981, the grand jury of
Troup County, Georgia indicted Heath for the offense of "malice"
murder.3
9
On February 10, 1982, Heath pleaded guilty to the Georgia murder
charge in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment. 4° As Heath un-
derstood the plea, parole was possible after serving as few as seven years
in prison.41 This plea bargain, however, was merely the beginning of an
interesting series of events.
On May 5, 1982, the grand jury of Russell County, Alabama, re-
turned an indictment against Heath for the capital offense of murder dur-
ing a kidnapping. 42 Heath now faced a possible death sentence for an
offense to which he had already pleaded guilty in Georgia. Before trial,
Heath entered pleas of autrefois convict 43 and former jeopardy under the
Alabama and United States Constitutions, arguing that his conviction
35. Many commentators, in analyzing the underlying rationale of the double jeopardy clause,
point out that, from the defendant's perspective, the harshness of multiple prosecutions is the same
whether they occur within one jurisdiction or in two. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 28; Pontikes, Dual
Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy: A Critique of Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 700 (1963).
36. 106 S. Ct. at 435.
37. Heath did not contend otherwise. Id. at 435.
38. Id.
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (1984).
40. 106 S. Ct. at 435.
41. Id.
42. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(1) (1982).
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (4th ed. 1968): "A plea by a criminal in bar to an indict-
ment that he has been formerly convicted of the same crime."
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and sentence in Georgia barred his prosecution in Alabama for the same
conduct. 44 Heath's second argument was that, because the crime had
been committed in Georgia, Alabama did not have jurisdiction to try
him.45 After a hearing, the trial court rejected the double jeopardy
claims.46 Subsequently, after the close of the State's case, the court also
rejected Heath's jurisdictional argument.
47
On January 12, 1983, the Alabama jury convicted Larry Heath of
murder during a kidnapping in the first degree. As expected, Heath re-
ceived the death penalty and immediately appealed the conviction. 48 On
appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, Heath again argued
autrefois convict and former jeopardy. The court rejected his arguments
and affirmed the conviction.49 In a unanimous decision, the Alabama
Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction. 50 In its opinion, the Ala-
bama Supreme Court noted that "if, for double jeopardy purposes, Ala-
bama is considered to be a sovereign entity vis-a-vis the federal
government then surely it is a sovereign entity vis-a-vis the State of Geor-
gia." 5' Because Heath failed to raise the jurisdictional issue before the
Alabama Supreme Court, he was precluded from arguing the issue before
the United States Supreme Court.
52
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, affirmed the Alabama Supreme Court's decision. Justices
Brennan and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions.
THE COURT'S REASONING
The Heath Court held that the dual sovereignty doctrine allows suc-
cessive prosecutions by two states for the same conduct. 53 It was noted,
early in the opinion, that had these offenses arisen under the laws of one
state, and had petitioner been separately prosecuted for both offenses in
that state, the second conviction would have been barred by the double
jeopardy clause.5 4 What the Court had to decide was whether to extend
the dual sovereignty doctrine from the federal-state context to cover suc-
cessive prosecutions by two different states.
44. 106 S. Ct. at 435.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 435-36.
48. Id. at 436.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Ex parte Heath, 455 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1984)).
51. Id. (quoting Heath, 455 So. 2d at 906).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 437.
54. Id.
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First, the Court reviewed the history of the dual sovereignty doc-
trine.55 After defining the concept of dual sovereignty, 56 the Court stated
that in applying the doctrine "the crucial determination is whether the
two entities that seek successively to prosecute a defendant for the same
course of conduct can be termed separate sovereigns. '57 For the Court,
this determination turned on whether the two entities drew their author-
ity to punish the offender from distinct sources of power. 58
The Court concluded that the states are separate sovereignties with
respect to each other. In support of this, the Court cited a long line of
precedent59 standing for the proposition that the states are separate sov-
ereignties with respect to the federal government "because each state's
power to prosecute is derived from its own 'inherent sovereignty,' not
from the Federal Government." 6 The Court then noted that "[T]he
states are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are with
respect to the Federal Government."'6 1 This statement was based on the
fact that the states' power to undertake criminal prosecutions derived
from the "separate and independent sources of power and authority orig-
inally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment.
' 62
The Court, by referring to cases in which it had applied the dual
sovereignty doctrine outside of the federal-state context,63 illustrated the
soundness of its analysis. The Court found support in United States v.
Wheeler 64 for the proposition that sovereignty, for double jeopardy pur-
poses, was determined by "the ultimate source of power under which the
respective prosecutions were undertaken. '65
The final step in the Court's analysis was to illustrate the cases in
55. See supra notes 8-35 and accompanying text.
56. 106 S. Ct. at 437. See also Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382.
57. 106 S. Ct. at 437.
58. Id. (noting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S.
387, 393 (1970); Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1937); United States v. Lanza,
260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907)).
59. 106 S. Ct. at 437.
60. Id. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320). See also Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 193-94 (1959) (collecting cases).
61. 106 S. Ct. at 438.
62. Id.
63. See supra note 29.
64. 435 U.S. 313.
65. In Wheeler, Justice Stewart noted (discussing Bartkus and Abbate):
And while the States, as well as the Federal Government, are subject to the overriding
requirements of the Federal Constitution, and the Supremacy Clause gives Congress within
its sphere the power to enact laws superceding conflicting laws of the States, this degree of
federal control over the exercise of state governmental power does not detract from the fact
that it is a State's own sovereignty which is the origin of its power.
Id. at 320.
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which it held the dual sovereignty doctrine inapplicable. 66 The Court
had reasoned that municipalities, as creations of the state, derive their
power to try a defendant from the "same organic law that empowers the
State to prosecute,"' 67 and thus, "are not separate sovereigns with respect
to the State."' 68 Along the same line, Puerto Rico v. The Shell Oil Co.69
was cited as holding that successive prosecutions by federal and territo-
rial courts70 are barred because such courts are "creations emanating
from the same sovereignty."
'7 1
The Heath Court's conclusion points out that each sovereign entity
has certain "interests" 72 that it must be allowed to protect. The Court, in
recognition of this fact, concluded that "a State must be entitled to de-
cide that a prosecution by another State has not satisfied its legitimate
sovereign interests. ' 73 For the Court, this conclusion followed logically
from the well-settled line of cases74 applying the dual sovereignty doc-
trine in the federal-state context. 75
JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENT
In his dissent, Justice Marshall concluded that the reasons for the
existence of the dual sovereignty doctrine do not justify extending its ap-
plication to successive state prosecutions. 76 His view was that the doc-
trine is applicable in the federal-state context because of the separate and
distinct interests the two sovereignties might have in a particular mat-
ter.77 For Justice Marshall, this justification was not present in the state-
66. See supra note 29.
67. 106 S. Ct. at 438.
68. Id.
69. 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
70. In The Shell Oil Co., the Court held that a prosecution under either the Sherman Act or the
Antitrust Act of Puerto Rico is a bar to a prosecution under the other for the same offense; thus,
there was no risk of double jeopardy. 302 U.S. at 264.
71. Id.
72. Heath, 106 S. Ct. at 440. The "interest" involved here recognizes the importance of law
enforcement to the notion of a state's sovereignty. A rule that prosecution by one sovereignty bars
prosecution by another for the same act could effectively frustrate the law enforcement practices of
the second sovereignty.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 8-35 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (state conviction-federal conviction); Bartkus, 329 U.S. 121
(federal acquittal-state conviction); Hebert, 272 U.S. 312 (federal conviction-state conviction). See
generally Annotation, Acquittal or Conviction in State Court as Bar to Federal Prosecution Based on
Same Act or Transaction, 18 A.L.R. FED. 393 (1974); Annotation, Conviction or Acquittal in Federal
Court as Bar to Prosecution in State Court for State Offense Based on Same Facts-Modern View, 6
A.L.R. 4th 802 (1981).
76. 106 S. Ct. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 443 ("The complementary nature of the sovereignty exercised by the Federal Govern-
ment and the States places upon a defendant burdens commensurate with concomitant privileges.").
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state context because of the identical sovereign concerns that all states
possess.
78
Justice Marshall's dissent also expressed concerns as to the funda-
mental fairness of Alabama's prosecution. He felt that the trial was un-
fair in that seventy-five of the eighty-two potential jurors were aware of
Heath's prior guilty plea in Georgia. He stated that, "[w]ith such a well-
informed jury, the outcome of the trial was surely a foregone conclu-
sion." 79 For Justice Marshall, Georgia and Alabama had joined forces to
do together what neither could have accomplished on its own-secure
the death penalty for Larry Heath.80
ANALYSIS
In Heath v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court ruled for the
first time on the proper application of the dual sovereignty doctrine as
applied to successive state prosecutions. By emphasizing the principles
of federalism, as well as stare decisis, the Court reached a just result.
Considering the available precedent, 8' and the current make-up of the
Court, this decision is not a surprising one. The Court's holding,
although viewed as working a potential hardship on the individual,82 is
the inevitable result of a thorough analysis, and consistent application, of
the dual sovereignty doctrine.
The Heath Court, in reaching its conclusion, conducted a thorough
analysis of the meaning and significance of the dual sovereignty doctrine.
The strength of the decision turns upon the Court's basis for extending
78. Id. at 444 ("Although the two States may have opted for different policies within their
assigned territorial jurisdictions, the sovereign concerns with whose vindication each State has been
charged are identical." Marshall continued this line of reasoning by noting that "in contrast to the
federal-state context, barring the second prosecution would still permit one government to act upon
the broad range of sovereign concerns that have been reserved to the States by the Constitution.").
79. Id. at 442.
80. Id. at 445.
81. See supra notes 8-35 and accompanying text.
82. Federalism, from the point of view of individual liberty, has its costs as well as its advan-
tages. Justice Frankfurter, in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958), observed: there is a
"price we pay for our federalism, for having our one people amenable to-as well as served and
protected by-two governments." In order to alleviate some of the potential hardships associated
with multiple prosecutions, the federal government developed what has become known as the Petite
policy (see Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960)). The policy was formulated by the Justice
Department in direct response to the Supreme Court's opinions in Bartkus and Abbate. These cases,
while reaffirming the Lanza rule of successive prosecutions, realized that there existed a potential for
abuse (see Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 138) in a rule permitting multiple prosecutions. The Petite policy
works to limit the bringing of federal prosecutions after a state prosecution to situations where the
federal prosecution is necessary to advance compelling interests of federal law enforcement. See
Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 28-29 ("The Petite policy was designed to limit the exercise of
the power to bring successive prosecutions for the same offense to situations comporting with the
rationale for the existence of that power.").
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the Lanza-Bartkus-Abbate rule8 3 to successive prosecutions by two differ-
ent states. This extension logically follows from the long line of histori-
cal precedent cited within the opinion.
4
Justice O'Connor interpreted the Lanza-Bartkus-Abbate rule as
compelling the conclusion that successive prosecutions under the laws of
different states fell within the meaning of the dual sovereignty "excep-
tion" to the double jeopardy clause.8 5 Justice O'Connor's use of prece-
dent makes the Court's argument clear and convincing. By contrasting
the various factual settings in which the dual sovereignty doctrine has
been applied, the opinion illustrates the consistency of the doctrine's ap-
plication, as well as its underlying rationale.8 6 By grouping prior deci-
sions on the basis of the applicability of the dual sovereignty theory, the
opinion clears a path for examining the states' role in our federal system,
and ultimately, employs this conceptualistic view8 7 to extend the doctrine
to encompass successive prosecutions by two states.
The Heath Court's emphasis on preserving the federal system as
originally envisioned88 is well placed. Recognizing that a state must be
allowed to satisfy its legitimate sovereign interests, the Court took the
well established theory of dual sovereignty and extended it to its next
logical conclusion: successive prosecutions by two states for the same
conduct are not barred by the double jeopardy clause.
Successive prosecutions are constitutionally permissible because of
the federal character of our union. The Framers of the Constitution di-
vided the powers of government between the states and the federal gov-
ernment in order to create a system that would provide greater
protection for the rights of individuals. While the intent was to dis-
83. These cases stand for the proposition that successive state and federal prosecutions are not
in violation of the fifth amendment. On this rule Justice Holmes wrote, "The general proposition is
too plain to need more than statement." See Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1926).
84. See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852). See supra notes 8-35 and accompanying
text.
85. 106 S. Ct. at 439 ("The Court's express rationale for the dual sovereignty doctrine is not
simply a fiction that can be disregarded in difficult cases.").
86. Id. at 438 ("These cases confirm that it is the presence of independent sovereign authority
to prosecute, not the relation between States and the Federal Government in our federalist system,
that constitutes the basis for the dual sovereignty doctrine."). In order to reinforce the propriety of
applying the dual sovereignty exception to successive prosecutions by two states, the Court con-
trasted Wheeler with The Shell Co., Grafton and Waller. Heath, 106 S. Ct. at 338. This contrast is
stated, quite correctly, as illustrating the appropriate instances when two entities that seek succes-
sively to prosecute a defendant for a single act can be termed separate sovereignties.
87. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
88. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137-38 ("Time has not lessened the concern of the Founders in
devising a federal system which would likewise be a safeguard against arbitrary government. The
greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system yields results with which a court is in
little sympathy.").
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tribute authority amongst the various levels of government, some degree
of overlap was inevitable. The Lanza-Bartkus-Abbate line of cases recog-
nizes that the federal-state relationship requires an exception to the prin-
ciple of double jeopardy. The Heath Court ruled that such an exception
is similarly necessary when two states seek to prosecute a person for the
same act. 89  Such a conclusion, although potentially disastrous to the
individual defendant, 90 follows logically from the "historical understand-
ing and political realities of the States' role in the federal system." 9'
Within our system of federalism, the states exist as integral compo-
nents of the union. Under the dual sovereignty theory, state and federal
courts do not regard a criminal proceeding within the other's jurisdiction
as a bar, under double jeopardy analysis, to a later proceeding within
their own court system. The rationale underlying this concept is that the
two units, very clearly, derive their authority to punish an offender from
independent sources. The states' original power to define and punish
crime was reserved to them by the tenth amendment, 92 while the federal
government derives its authority from specific provisions of the Constitu-
tion.93 Thus, a state's power to prosecute is derived from its own "inher-
ent sovereignty," not from the federal government.
Successive federal-state prosecutions are supported by the basic con-
cerns of our federal system. The states' existence and interactions with
one another are part of this system. Thus, the very same constraints
placed on the Court by the federal character of our system in its treat-
ment of successive state-federal prosecutions exist in the state-state con-
text. 94 It is upon this notion that the Heath majority lays the foundation
for extending the dual sovereignty doctrine. "The States," explained Jus-
tice O'Connor, "are no less sovereign with respect to each other than
they are with respect to the Federal Government."95  Accepting this
89. 106 S. Ct. at 438 ("The States are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are
with respect to the Federal Government.").
90. See Abbate, 359 U.S. at 198-99 ("The basis of the Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy is that a person shall not be harassed by successive trials; that an accused shall not
have to marshall the resources and energies necessary for his defense more than once for the same
alleged criminal acts.").
91. 106 S. Ct. at 439.
92. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381 (eighteenth amendment "adopted for
the purpose of establishing prohibition as a national policy.").
94. See Heath, 106 S. Ct. at 440 ("Just as the Federal Government has the right to decide that a
state prosecution has not vindicated a violation of the 'peace and dignity' of the Federal Govern-
ment, a State must be entitled to decide that a prosecution by another State has not satisfied its
legitimate sovereign interests.").
95. Id. at 438.
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premise as true is the key link in extending dual sovereignty from the
federal-state context to the state-state context.
In his dissent,96 Justice Marshall felt that there was no need for such
an extension. He argued that, rather than allowing each state to satisfy
its individual interests, it would be consistent with pervading notions of
federalism to bar a second prosecution on the theory that one state gov-
ernment has been permitted to "act upon the broad range of sovereign
concerns that have been reserved to the States by the Constitution. '97
The majority expressly rejected this argument. "A State's interest in vin-
dicating its sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws," argued
Justice O'Connor, "by definition can never be satisfied by another State's
enforcement of its own laws."98
In light of case law defining the concept of a "state," and its role in
our federal system,99 Marshall's argument is unpersuasive. It is clear
that a state's power to undertake criminal prosecutions derives from that
source of power and authority originally belonging to it before admission
to the Union and preserved to it by the tenth amendment. 100 Thus, prior
to the drafting of the Constitution, each state, by definition, derived its
authority from separate and independent sources of power. 01 It has
long been held that, with respect to one another, each state is "equal."' 10 2
To say that a state's legitimate interests can be satisfied by a prosecution
conducted by another state would be to disrupt accepted principles of
federalism, and would constitute a serious deprivation of a state's sover-
eign powers. Thus, each state's prosecution for a crime against its au-
thority is an exercise of its own sovereignty, separate and apart from that
exercised by a sister state. To hold successive prosecutions unconstitu-
tional would, therefore, enable one sovereignty to effectively deny the
other the right to administer its criminal laws. Under basic notions of
federalism, this frustration of sovereign interests cannot exist. From this
96. Justice Brennan joined in Justice Marshall's dissent, writing separately only to clarify his
views on the "different interests" approach in determining whether two prosecutions are for the
same "offense." Id. at 440 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 440 (emphasis in original).
99. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911) ("The definition of a 'State' is found in
the powers possessed by the original States which adopted the Constitution, a definition emphasized
by the terms employed in all subsequent acts of Congress admitting new States into the Union.").
100. See supra note 92.
101. See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567 (The states are "equal in power, dignity and authority, each
competent to exert that residium of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion itself.").
102. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. See also Coyle, 221 U.S. at 580 ("the consti-
tutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized").
DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
line of analysis it was but a short jump for the Court to extend the dual
sovereignty doctrine to permit successive prosecutions by two states. 103
To support the conclusion that successive prosecutions are constitu-
tionally permissible, the dual sovereignty doctrine creates the notion that
for double jeopardy purposes, one act,' 04 when violative of the laws of
two sovereignties, constitutes two distinct "offenses."'10 5 This conceptu-
alism, required by the American federal system as embodied in the Con-
stitution, is crucial to the propriety of the Lanza-Bartkus-Abbate rule.' 
06
This rule, read in conjunction with United States v. Wheeler,'0 7 compels
the conclusion that, for dual sovereignty purposes, two states should be
considered separate sovereignties. To commit a crime that violates the
laws of two states will subject a criminal defendant to successive prosecu-
tions for what, in essence, is a single act. For double jeopardy purposes,
this "act," quite correctly, constitutes two "offenses."
Heath v. Alabama was, therefore, decided correctly. To hold other-
wise would have required the overruling of the Lanza-Bartkus-Abbate
line of cases. Such a decision would yield undesirable consequences.
0 8
Invalidating successive prosecutions would either hinder federal law en-
forcement or, in the alternative, erode the traditional law enforcement
responsibilities of the state.'0 9 The dual sovereignty theory recognizes
103. The Heath majority relied upon the dual sovereignty doctrine to reach its conclusion.
Heath argued that the Court should restrict the applicability of the doctrine to cases in which two
governmental entities "can demonstrate that allowing only one entity to exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant will interfere with the unvindicated interests of the second entity and that multiple
prosecutions therefore are necessary for the satisfaction of the legitimate interests of both entities."
106 S. Ct. at 439. Rejecting this, the Court responded: "If the States are separate sovereigns, as they
must be under the definition of sovereignty which the Court consistently has employed, the circum-
stances of the case are irrelevant." Id.
104. See, e.g., Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121 (robbery of federally insured bank constitutes two offenses
for double jeopardy purposes). See also Kirchheimer, The Act. The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58
YALE L.J. 513 (1949).
105. See Kirchheimer, supra note 104.
106. See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
107. 435 U.S. 313, 322 ("The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, 'inherent powers of limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.' ") (quoting F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)).
108. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 317-18 ("It was noted in Abbate ...that the 'undesirable conse-
quences' that would result from the imposition of a double jeopardy bar in such circumstances fur-
ther support the 'dual sovereignty' concept. Prosecution by one sovereign for a relatively minor
offense might bar prosecution by the other for a much graver one .... ). Cf Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944).
109. See Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195:
But one would suggest that, in order to maintain the effectiveness of federal law enforce-
ment, it is desirable completely to displace state power to prosecute crimes based on acts
which might also violate federal law. This would bring about a marked change in the
distribution of powers to administer criminal justice, for the states under our federal sys-
tem have the principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes.
See also Screws, 325 U.S. at 104; Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1943).
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the importance of a sovereignty's right to satisfy its legitimate interests.
If a prior state or federal prosecution acted as a bar to a subsequent pros-
ecution by a second sovereignty, one sovereignty's act would effectively
deny the other the right to administer its criminal laws. In the state-state
context, this would have the effect of denying a state the right to satisfy
its legitimate sovereign interests because another state has won "the race
to the courthouse."' t 0 Such a result is wholly inconsistent with basic
notions of American federalism, and thus, supports the conclusion that
the dual sovereignty doctrine is applicable in the state-state context.
The Court's holding in Heath further solidifies the future of multiple
prosecutions. In certain instances, the dual sovereignty doctrine yields
somewhat harsh results. The Heath majority, however, recognized that
its role is limited to determining the constitutionality of certain govern-
mental actions. While the dissent expressed a certain uneasiness with the
result,I t I it is clear that the Court's ultimate holding was constitutionally
compelled. Any attempt to alleviate the harshness of successive prosecu-
tions by different states must, quite properly, come from the state
legislatures.
CONCLUSION
The dual sovereignty doctrine created an exception to the double
jeopardy clause. Historically, the doctrine was applied almost exclu-
sively in cases involving successive prosecutions by a state and the federal
government. In Heath v. Alabama, the Supreme Court extended the doc-
trine to successive prosecutions by two different states. The Court held
that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment did not bar Ala-
bama from trying Larry Heath for the capital offense of murder during a
kidnapping after a Georgia court had convicted him of murder based on
the same homicide. The Heath opinion reflects the persuasiveness of
prior case law, as well as the prerequisites of federalism. The Court's
reliance on precedent and the practical considerations of the states' role
in our federal system provided a sound basis for extending the theory of
dual sovereignty. The holding of the case leaves no doubt as to the doc-
trine's proper application in the context of successive state prosecutions.
JAY BRICKMAN
110. See Heath, 106 S. Ct. at 440.
111. Id. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Whether viewed as a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause or simply as an affront to the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, Alabama's
prosecution of petitioner cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.").
